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Psychological game theory can help provide a rational choice explanation of framing effects; 
frames influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivations. We explain this theoretically, and explore 
the empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2×2 design of one-shot public good games we show 
that frames affect subject’s first- and second-order beliefs, and contributions. From a 
psychological game-theoretic framework we derive two mutually compatible hypotheses about 
guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order 
beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent with either.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Experiments in psychology and economics have shown that the framing of decisions may 
matter to preferences and choice (cf. Pruitt 1967; Selten & Berg 1970). This may reflect a failure 
by decision makers to exhibit “elementary requirements of consistency and coherence”, as found 
by Tversky & Kahneman (1981) in a classic paper. Our main objective is to theoretically 
articulate, and experimentally illustrate, a further reason why framing may matter. We shall make 
no reference to irrationality, and the sort of framing effect we highlight comes from an interaction 
of frames and players’ motivation. Framing may influence strategic behavior in games by 
influencing motivation that depends on beliefs, about choices and beliefs, in subtle ways. 
Our message partly echoes the insight that focal points may influence coordination, as 
first noted by Schelling (1960) and investigated experimentally by Mehta, Starmer & Sugden 
(1994). The idea here is that a description of a strategic situation may possess cues that serve to 
coordinate choice behavior. This entails that descriptions influence beliefs about others’ choices, 
which in turn may have bearing on a person’s rational choice. However, we push beyond this 
observation as follows: We argue that if players are emotional or care for the intentions and 
desires of others, then framing may influence behavior independently of how beliefs about 
others’ choices change. Frames may influence beliefs about others’ beliefs, which in itself may 
influence a person’s choice even if his or her belief about others’ actions is given. The reason is 
that if players are emotional or care for the intentions and desires of others, then motivations may 
depend on beliefs directly. 
The upshot is that framing may play a very special role in psychological games, as 
defined by Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (1989). These structures differ from standard games 
in that the domain of a payoff function includes beliefs, not just strategy profiles. A body of 
recent work (cited in more detail below) in experimental economics and behavioral theory argues   2 
that psychological games are needed to capture some important ‘social’ preferences, like 
reciprocity or guilt aversion (a desire not to let others down).  
In psychological games, motivation depends on beliefs (about choices and about beliefs) 
directly, so if beliefs are changed motivation may flip too. The key contribution of this paper is to 
tie this observation in with framing effects: frames may influence beliefs, which, as we just said, 
spells action in psychological games. Effectively, what we propose is an explanation why frames 
may matter when decision-makers interact strategically. 
We are concerned with how frames affect choices and propose to understand this as a 
two-part process: (i) frames move beliefs, and (ii) beliefs shape motivation and choice. The 
hypotheses we will derive based on psychological game theory entail specific statements about 
(ii). As regards (i) no comprehensive theory exists yet. We will discuss some relevant conjectures 
based on what has been reported in the economic and psychological literature but leave a 
thorough theory development for future research.  
There seems to be almost no prior theoretical work which attempts to explain framing 
effects. One shining exception is “variable frame theory” (VFT) (Bacharach 1993, Bacharach & 
Bernasconi 1997), which describes how players in a game conceptualize strategies and how this 
mental process affects play. This is different from our perspective; VFT deals with how players 
create frames while we look at how given frames affect choices and beliefs. As explained in the 
previous paragraph, we propose to understand framing as a two-step chain. If we were to factor in 
VFT we would have to add a step (o), to precede even step (i).
1 We have made no attempt to link 
the approaches here, but future research may have such a goal in mind. 
                                                 
1 To get a perspective on (o) versus (i) & (ii), consider the following quote from Kahneman (2000, p. xiv) (about 
him, Tversky and framing): “A significant and perhaps unfortunate early decision concerned the naming of the new 
concept. For reasons of conceptual and terminological economy we chose to apply the label ‘frame’ to descriptions 
of decision problems at two levels: the formulation to which decision makers are exposed is called a frame and so is   3 
In Section 2, we provide a theoretical elucidation regarding the potential relevance of our 
new approach to framing effects. In Section 3, we report the results of an experiment designed to 
explore the empirical relevance of the idea. We choose a simple public good game as our 
workhorse, and derive and test predictions based on two psychological-game based models. Our 
findings may be of independent interest to the experimental literature on framing in public goods 
(and social dilemma) games; in Section 4 we discuss and compare results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. FRAMING EFFECTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL GAMES 
The key idea of this paper is that frames may shape players’ beliefs in games, which may 
in turn influence strategic choices. Part of this message is reflected in the literature on focal 
points, which goes back to Schelling. He noted that in many games certain choices are ‘focal’, 
which may facilitate coordination. A classic example involves two persons meeting in New York 
City: going to Grand Central Station may be a focal choice. 
Schelling’s NYC example involves focal points created by properties possessed by a 
particular strategy, but one can easily imagine how focal points are similarly created by the 
framing of a game. Consider the two following games, which differ only by name: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
the interpretation that they construct for themselves. Thus, framing is a common label for two very different things: 
an experimental manipulation and a constituent activity of decision making. Our terminological parsimony was 
helpful in securing the acceptance of the concept of framing, but it also had its costs. The use of a single term blurred 
the important distinction between what decision makers do and what is done to them: the activities of editing and 
mental accounting on the one hand and the susceptibility to framing effects on the other.” 
   4 
The let's get 7 game:        The let's get 9 game: 
          a     b                a     b 
a  (9, 9)  (0, 8)                      a  (9, 9)  (0, 8) 
b  (8, 0)  (7, 7)       b  (8, 0)  (7, 7) 
 
Are these games the same? They have player sets, strategy sets, and payoff functions in 
common. However, the games’ names differ, and different names may trigger different beliefs in 
the players' minds. They may, for example, coordinate on different equilibria in the two cases: 
Imagine that each player chooses b in the first game, while each player chooses a in the second 
game. This illustrates how frames could, in principle, shape play.
2 
In the preceding example, frames shape beliefs and beliefs influence behavior, ultimately 
because of what beliefs tell a player about a co-player’s choices. So far so good, but nothing in 
this is really original. The new thing in this paper is instead to point out that the link from frames 
to beliefs to actions does not necessarily rely on perceptions of others’ behavior. To make this 
point as clear as possible, consider the following example. The example will exhibit how a frame 
may influence a player’s beliefs which influence the player’s behavior, and yet it is from the 
outset inconceivable that any other player’s behavior could change.  
The example is a dictator game.
3 The first player, the dictator, chooses how to divide a 
sum of money, say $1000, between the two players. The second player, the recipient, has no real 
choice – she has to simply accept the dictator’s decision. Now assume that the dictator does not 
                                                 
2 The let’s get 7 and let’s get 9 games are so-called stag-hunt games, amply discussed for the intriguing coordination 
problem embodied. This matters e.g. to theories of equilibrium selection (e.g. Harsany & Selten 1988; Carlsson & 
van Damme 1993), examinations of the impact of communication (e.g. Aumann 1990; Charness 2000, Clark, Kay & 
Sefton 2001), and the impact of learning (e.g. Crawford 1995). We thus add framing to this list of topics.  
3 Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin & Sefton (1994) were among the first to study the dictator game, which has 
subsequently been used in many experimental studies.    5 
like to let others down; he suffers from guilt (an emotional response) if he gives others less than 
he believes they expect. We will say that the dictator is guilt averse.
4 
Now imagine that one ran an experiment on this game, with the twist of calling it by 
different names in different treatments. Say that the game was referred to as either 
•  The let’s split a grand game, or 
•  The German tipping game. 
Imagine that most subjects make the equal split in the first case, that most subjects give 
away just small change in the second case, and that all of this happens because the dictator 
subjects hold vastly different beliefs about what recipients expect to get in the two cases. Under 
the first frame, dictators choose the equal split because that is what they expect recipients to 
expect them to do, and dictators would feel exceedingly guilty unless they lived up to these 
expectations. Under the second frame, they give away peanuts because this is all they expect the 
recipient to expect. This illustrates how a frame could, in principle, influence a dictator’s beliefs, 
which influence his motivation, which influences his behavior, despite there being no strategic 
uncertainty whatsoever about what other players do. 
We have two more comments about this example. First, it makes reference to a non-
standard form of motivation which is non-standard, in the sense that it cannot be modeled using 
traditional game theory. To see this, note that in traditional (normal form) games player i has a 
utility of the form 
ui: A →  IR,     (1) 
                                                 
4 Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) introduced the term guilt aversion and Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2007) develop a 
general theory. Dufwenberg & Gneezy (2000) report experimental dictator game evidence in line with guilt aversion, 
although they do not consider framing effects.    6 
where  A  is the set of strategy profiles of the game. Applied to the dictator game, A  = 
Adictator×Arecipient = [$0, $1000]×{accept}, where Adictator and Arecipient are the players’ respective 
strategy sets (the elements of the former specifying how much the dictator gives away). Such a 
formulation, whether used to model selfishness or some kind of other-regarding motivation (like 
altruism, or inequity aversion) predicts a uniquely defined set of best responses for i.
5 By 
contrast, in the example, the guilt averse dictator’s set of best responses depends on his beliefs 
about the recipient’s beliefs. Hence (1) cannot describe those preferences; hence traditional game 
theory is not a rich enough toolbox to handle this case. 
To model belief-dependent preferences, such as the dictator’s guilt aversion in the 
example, one must move to utilities of the following form: 
ui: A×Mi →  IR,     (2) 
where Mi is i’s beliefs (about choices and beliefs), somehow described. Thus we need to move 
from standard games to so-called psychological games, as introduced by Geanakoplos et al.
6 
Our second comment relates to (2) and the extent to which that utility specification is 
actually more general than is borne out by the example involving the guilt averse dictator. That 
example showed how a frame may influence a player’s beliefs, which influence his motivation, 
which influences his behavior, despite there being no strategic uncertainty whatsoever about what 
other players do. The formulation (2), however, is by no means limited to that case; (2) allows 
that, as frames change, so do beliefs of any order, including beliefs about others’ strategies. What 
comes out of this may be framing effects that have a hybrid quality to them: frames may 
                                                 
5 Examples: If the dictator is selfish, then his set of best responses is {$0}; if his objective is to minimize the 
difference between his payoff and the recipient's, then his set of best responses is {$500}; if his objective is to 
maximize the maximum payoff to one of the players, then his set of best responses is {$0, $1000}. 
6 Cf. also Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2008) who generalize Geanakoplos et al’s framework in several directions 
(including allowing updated beliefs to influence utility and having incomplete information; such extensions are 
important in many applications, but do not concern us here, however).    7 
influence a player’s beliefs, which influence his motivation directly as well as his perception of 
others’ choices, and all of this influences his behavior. In other words, beliefs about anything in 
the domain of the utility in (2) may move behavior, and the domain includes both others’ choices 
and others’ beliefs. All those, potentially complex, links from frames to beliefs to actions are 
what we have in mind when we talk about our new approach to framing effects. 
 
3. FRAMING & FREE-RIDING: AN EXPERIMENT 
In this section we report the results of an experiment, designed to examine the empirical 
relevance of the ideas introduced in Section 2. The subsections that follow will in turn: 
A.  introduce, and motivate the choice of, our vehicle of research: a public good game, 
B.  discuss framing issues, 
C.  incorporate guilt aversion and reciprocity using psychological game theory, 
D.  derive testable predictions for the thus derived psychological public good games,  
E.  present the experimental design and procedures,  
F.  report the results. 
 
3.A The public good game 
As a vehicle of investigation we wish to select a game for which framing effects have 
already been documented, so that we can relate to and help further understand previous work. A 
linear public good game is our choice. Numerous experiments have shown the existence of 
framing effects (cf. Section 3.B), and since public good games represent many economically 
important situations that require the agents’ voluntary cooperation it is important to understand 
how frames affect voluntary cooperation. 
Linear public good games have the advantage of being simple, which makes a 
psychological game-theoretic analysis tractable (cf. Sections 3.C-D). The simplicity is due to the   8 
fact that selfish players have a dominant strategy to free ride, i.e., subjects’ optimal behavior is 
independent of others’ behavior. Yet, numerous experiments have shown that many people do not 
play accordingly (Ledyard 1995). In particular, although previous work has not made connection 
to psychological games, there is evidence that subjects’ choices may depend on their beliefs.
7 
Thus, since our argument is that frames may influence beliefs and beliefs may affect motivations 
and thereby behavior, public good experiments are well-suited for our purposes.  
We consider a public good game with the following structure: Each of three players 
simultaneously chooses how to allocate twenty monetary units between a ‘private’ and a ‘public’ 
account. The sum of what the players contribute to the public account is multiplied by 1.5, to 
determine its total value. A player’s earnings is the sum of whatever he or she puts in the private 
account, plus one third of the total value of the public account. 
The situation can be represented as a normal form game G=(Ai, πi)i∈N such that N={1,2,3} 
is the player set, Ai = {0,1,…,20} is the strategy set of player i, and πi: ×j∈N Aj→IR is i’s monetary 
payoff function defined by  
πi(a1, a2, a3)   = 20 – ai + (1/3)⋅(3/2)⋅(a1 + a2 + a3) = 
= 20 – ai + ½⋅(a1 + a2 + a3).   (3) 
All experimental treatments are set up to implement that structure. The treatments differ 
only in the frames used (cf. Sections 3.B & 3.E). 
 
                                                 
7 For instance, Croson (2007) and Fischbacher & Gächter (2006) have shown that a subject’s contribution is often 
highly positively correlated with the subject’s beliefs about others’ contributions. This result is anticipatory of one of 
our hypotheses (H2) below.    9 
3.B Framing 
In selecting the frames to be examined, we take inspiration from some previous work on 
framing in the context of social dilemma-type games. A common distinction concerns whether a 
frame changes a reference point or whether it just consists of different wordings. We refer to 
these as valence framing and label framing. 
Valence framing concerns whether the same essential information is put in a positive or a 
negative light (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth 1998). Several studies have looked at valence framings 
in public good provision. In the standard public good experiment subjects are endowed with some 
money, which they can keep for themselves or contribute to public good. Call this situation a give 
treatment. Thus, any contribution to the public good is a positive externality for all other players 
by definition of a public good. Another framing is to endow the group with the resources and to 
allow the group members to withdraw resources; call this a take treatment. A common result is 
that in the give treatment contributions to a repeatedly played public good are higher than in the 
take treatment (cf. Fleishman 1988; Andreoni 1995; Sonnemans, Schram & Offerman 1998; 
Willinger & Ziegelmeyer 1999; Cookson 2000; Park 2000).
8  
Label framing is involved if subjects are confronted with alternative, but objectively 
equivalent problem wordings (see, e.g., Elliott, Hayward & Canon 1998 who call this a “pure 
framing effect”). Ross & Ward (1996) and Liberman, Samuels & Ross (2004) report one of the 
best-known labeling effects. In their experiments a simple prisoners’ dilemma game was either 
called the “Community Game”, or the “Wall Street Game”. Otherwise, the game and the 
                                                 
8 Results are not altogether uniform though; see also the one-shot public good games in Brandts & Schwieren (2007), 
Cubitt, Drouvelis & Gächter (2008) and Walkowitz & Goerg (2007/Isreali treatment) who basically do not find a 
framing effect.   10 
instructions were identical. Cooperation rates were significantly lower under the “Wall Street” 
frame than under the “Community Game” frame.
9 
Previous studies have either looked at valence framing or at label framing, but we study 
both simultaneously. As we explain further in Section 3.E, we develop a 2×2 design that varies 
both the label (community versus neutral treatments) and the valence (give versus take 
treatments). Thus, our factorial design allows us to assess the relative importance of these 
different versions of framing effects. 
Our main contribution, however, is to move beyond the existing literature on framing by 
eliciting first- and second-order beliefs. This will help us testing hypotheses based on 
psychological game theory which can embrace framing effects. We discuss this latter topic next.  
 
3.C Guilt aversion and reciprocity 
Most of economic theory depicts decision makers as ‘selfish’, in the sense that they care 
only about their own monetary payoffs. In the context of the public good game we consider, this 
would correspond to assuming that (3) (or a similar formulation modified to control for risk-
aversion) can describe players’ preferences. By contrast, a rich body of experimental evidence 
suggests that decision makers often have more complex objectives, and in particular that they 
somehow care about what others get or do or hope to achieve. Some theoretical models have been 
proposed, with the objective to model such social preferences, and some such models build on 
                                                 
9 Rege & Telle (2004) similarly played a one-shot public goods experiment and found higher contributions under a 
“community” frame than under a neutral frame. Further studies on label frame effects comprise Pillutla & Chen 
(1999), Burnham, McCabe, & Smith (2000), Abbink & Hennig-Schmidt (2006). See Gächter, Orzen, Renner & 
Starmer (2007) for a natural field experiment on label framing.    11 
psychological game theory.
10 We focus on two of these – guilt aversion and reciprocity – and use 
them to derive testable implications that we subsequently address in the experiment.  
 
Guilt aversion is dislike of the guilt felt if one chooses so as to give others less than one 
expects them to expect. Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2007) develop a general theory; we draw on 
their notion of “simple guilt:”
11 Let bij denote i’s ‘first-order belief’ about j’s choice (i,j=1,2,3; 
i≠j); bij is the mean of a probability distribution i has over Aj. Let ciji denote i’s ‘second-order 
belief’ about bji; ciji is the mean of a probability measure i has over the possible values of bji. One 
way to model guilt aversion is to assume that i suffers from guilt to the extent that he puts less in 
the public account than the average of what he believes his two co-players believe he puts in the 
public account. Formally, his utility function ui* can be defined by 
ui*(a1, a2, a3, ciji, ciki) = 20 – ai + ½⋅(a1 + a2 + a3) – γi⋅max{0, (ciji + ciki)/2 – ai} (4) 
where i, j, k = 1, 2, 3; i ≠ j ≠ k ≠ i, and where γi ≥ 0 is a parameter measuring i’s degree of guilt 
aversion. If γi = 0, (4) has the same RHS as (3) and ai = 0 is a dominant strategy. If 0 < γi < ½, the 
RHS of (4) changes, but ai = 0 is still a dominant strategy. However, if γi > ½ very different 
possibilities come alive, as i’s best response will be ai = (ciji+ ciki)/2. In this case i’s best response 
is belief dependent.  
With reference to (1) and (2) in Section 2, note that (4) has the form ui: A×Mi → IR  rather 
than ui: A → IR, since (4) includes beliefs in its domain. G*=(Ai, ui*)i∈N  is a psychological game. 
 
                                                 
10 For discussions of the experimental evidence as well as of many models, see Fehr & Gächter (2000), Camerer 
(2003, Ch. 2), and Sobel (2005). Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2005) survey models that use psychological game theory. 
11 Huang & Wu (1994), Dufwenberg & Gneezy (2000), Dufwenberg (2002), Charness & Dufwenberg (2006), and 
Bacharach, Guerra & Zizzo (2007) consider similar sentiments in trust games. In motivating their concept, Battigalli 
& Dufwenberg cite work in social psychology by Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton (1994) and Tangney (1995).    12 
 Reciprocity is a desire to get even, to respond to perceived wrongdoings with revenge and 
to reward perceived kindness. Rabin (1993) developed a theory of reciprocity, which made the 
meaning of words like “kindness” precise. Rabin argues that kindness depends on what a player 
believes about others’ choices, as this can capture a player’s ‘intentions’. Moreover, reciprocal 
motivation depends in general on beliefs about kindness, and hence on beliefs about beliefs since 
kindness depends on beliefs. Psychological game theory is again called for. 
Rabin’s objective is to call attention to two central qualitative aspects of reciprocity, and 
he restricts attention to two-player normal form games. Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004) and 
Falk & Fischbacher (2006) provide extensions that allow for more players (and which also 
consider extensive games). The following draws on the former model.  
Applied to our game, the utility of player i is given by ui** defined by 
ui**(a1, a2, a3, bij,bik) = 20 – ai + ½⋅(a1 + a2 + a3) + Yi⋅(κij⋅λiji + κik⋅λiki) (5) 
where again i, j, k = 1, 2, 3; i ≠ j ≠ k ≠ i, and where the last term is in special need of further 
explanation. All but the last terms in (5) capture how the agent cares for own income (cf. (3) and 
(4)). The last term captures how he is motivated by reciprocity: Yi ≥ 0 is a constant measuring i’s 
sensitivity to reciprocity; κij, κik, λiji, and λiki depend on i‘s choice or beliefs: κij represents i’s 
kindness to j – it is positive (negative) if i is kind (unkind); λiji represents i’s belief about how 
kind j is to i – it is positive (negative) if i believes that j is kind (unkind). κik and λiki have 
analogous interpretations. Equation (5) captures reciprocity by making it in i’s interest to match 
the signs of κij and λiji, and of κik and λiki, ceteris paribus.
 
We need to calculate κij, λiji, κik, and λiki. This turns out to be (more) straightforward 
(than analogous calculations in many other games). Although in general games kindness depends   13 
on beliefs this is not the case in the public good game because there is a one-to-one link between 
a player’s choice and his kindness. This is because, independently of the co-players’ choices, 
there is a one-to-one link between a player’s choice and his impact on the other players’ 
monetary payoffs. Player i’s kindness to j [or k] is the difference between what i actually gives to 
j [or k] and the average of the maximum (=20) and minimum (=0) that i could give to j [or k]. We 
get κij = κik = ai–10. To get λiji, note first that this is i’s belief about κji = aj–10, so just replace 
aj by bij in the RHS of that expression; instead of κij = ai–10 we get λiji = bij–10. Similarly, we 
get λiki = bik–10. All in all, we can re-write the RHS of (5) to get (5’):  
20 – ai + ½⋅(a1 + a2 + a3) + Yi⋅[(ai – 10)⋅(bij – 10) + (ai – 10)(bik – 10)] =  
= 20 – ai + ½⋅(a1 + a2 + a3) + Yi⋅[(ai – 10)⋅(bij + bik – 20)].                                              (5’) 
 
If bij+bik–20 ≤ 0 (5’) is maximized by ai=0 regardless of Yi. The interpretation is that i does not 
consider j and k to be, on average, kind, so there is no reason for i to sacrifice payoff to help j and 
k.  If bij+bik–20 > 0, then (5’) is maximized by ai = 20 if Yi is large enough and by ai = 0 if Yi is 
small enough. (Besides these cases there are additional combinations of bij, bik, and Yi that make i 
indifferent between all his strategies.) The formulation joins the above one on guilt aversion in 
that what is a best response depends on i’s beliefs, although different beliefs matter this time. 
With reference to (1) and (2) in Section 2, note that (5) (based on (5’)) has the form ui: 
A×Mi → IR rather than ui: A → IR, since the utility function defined in (5) (based on (5’)) includes 
beliefs in its domain. Hence G**=(Ai, ui**)i∈N  is a psychological game. 
    14 
3.D Hypotheses 
Our experiment is set up to test the two theories presented in Section 3.C, as well as to 
check if/how framing matters. Since the utility functions (4) and (5) (based on (5’)) include 
beliefs in their domains, the theories can be directly tested if one observes beliefs. Our design 
allows us to elicit some beliefs that are relevant to this task.
12 We describe the procedure for 
belief elicitation in detail in Section 3.E. 
We formulate our hypotheses with reference to the choices and beliefs of individual 
players, rather than in terms of some equilibrium that would give predictions for all players 
jointly. If we focused on equilibria, we would run the risk of incorrectly rejecting a valid insight 
about motivation only because people did not coordinate well. Our approach is consistent with 
the theory in Section 3.C, where we merely discussed properties of an individual player’s best 
responses rather than equilibrium.
13 
Hypothesis H1 concerns guilt aversion. Recall that if γi  < ½ then i’s best response is ai = 0 
even if (ciji+ ciki)/2 > 0; if γi > ½ then i’s best response is to match his or her second-order beliefs: 
ai = (ciji+ ciki)/2.
14  Our design allows us to measure and observe the second-order beliefs (ciji+ 
ciki)/2, but γi is not observed. We rely on our choice and belief data to get a testable prediction. 
The theory, as described, implies that ai∈{0, (ciji+ ciki)/2} with ai = (ciji+ ciki)/2 whenever ai >0. 
                                                 
12 Dufwenberg & Gneezy (2000), Bhatt & Camerer (2005), Charness & Dufwenberg (2006), Bacharach, Guerra & 
Zizzo (2007), Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjøtta & Torsvik (2008) and Vanberg (2008) also measure beliefs in 
experiments with the purpose of connecting to psychological game theory (in the Bhatt & Camerer case the purpose 
is mainly broader). It is furthermore interesting to note that Ross & Ward (1996, p 108), who conducted the framing 
study we discussed in section 3.B, made some remarks which may be taken to indicate their interest in our approach. 
They call for further research on how a label influences the way subjects feel they ought to play and how a label 
changes their expectations about how the other player would choose to play. The authors conjecture that a frame may 
even alter subjects’ beliefs about how the other player would expect them to play. 
13 Moreover, since the experiment involves a one-shot game, with no chance for learning, it would seem extreme to 
assume that people would be able to make correct prediction about one another.  
14 If γ=½ then anything is a best response for i but we ignore this possibility.    15 
We test a somewhat weaker prediction (involving positive correlation rather than equality 
between ai and (ciji+ciki)/2). If the prediction holds true this would support the idea that the guilt 
aversion theory is approximately (rather than exactly) correct. We separate subjects with ai = 0 & 
(ciji+ciki)/2 > 0, for whom we ‘know’ that γi  < ½, and the others: 
H1: ai = 0 & (ciji+ciki)/2 > 0 or there is a positive correlation between ai and (ciji+ciki)/2. 
H1 predicts that for subjects that contribute non-zero amounts contributions and second-
order beliefs are positively correlated. To determine if we can support H1, we perform a one-
sided test of the null hypothesis of zero correlation between ai and (ciji+ciki)/2 considering only 
those i for which it is not the case that ai = 0 & (ciji+ciki)/2 > 0. 
Hypothesis H2 concerns reciprocity. Our design allows us to measure and observe the 
first-order beliefs bij and bik. However, as was the case with γi for the case of guilt aversion, Yi is 
unobservable so again we have to make a few assumptions to derive a testable prediction. Recall 
from Section 3.C that with reciprocal motivation the predicted choices are either 0 [implied when 
(bij + bik)/2 ≤ 10] or 20 [which would imply (bij + bik)/2 > 10].
15 Again we test a somewhat 
weaker prediction (involving positive correlation rather than the bang-bang 0-20 split of ai 
depending on (bij + bik)/2). If the prediction holds true this would support the idea that the 
reciprocity theory is approximately (rather than exactly) correct. H2 invokes one more proviso. 
Consider subjects who exhibit ai = 0 and (bij + bik)/2 = 20. We ‘know’ that Yi is so low that they 
                                                 
15 We here ignore the possibility that (for certain combinations of Yi, bij, and bik) i may be indifferent between all his 
choices. This time the assumption may not be quite as innocuous as the analogous assumption in the case of guilt 
aversion (cf. footnote 14) since the indifferences would not solely depend on the exogenous parameter Yi (in analogy 
to the γ=½ case) but also on the first-order beliefs bij, bik which would be endogenously determined if we applied 
some equilibrium concept. However, as explained in the text, we do not apply any equilibrium concept.    16 
would never reciprocate kindness with kindness. The following hypothesis treats these subjects 
separately (cf. the “ai = 0 & (ciji+ciki)/2 > 0” part of H1): 
H2: ai = 0 & (bij+bik)/2 = 20 or there is a positive correlation between ai and (bij+bik)/2. 
To examine H2, we perform a one-sided test of the null of zero correlation between ai and 
(bij+bik)/2 considering only those i for which it is not true that ai = 0 & (bij+bik)/2 = 20. 
Note that hypotheses H1 and H2 differ with respect to the beliefs involved. Guilt-aversion 
operates via second-order beliefs whereas reciprocity works on first-order beliefs. Note also that 
our experiment is not set up to test guilt aversion against reciprocity; in our game the two theories 
do not necessarily imply mutually inconsistent testable predictions. 
H1 and H2 represent directional research hypotheses derived from specific theories, and so 
will be submitted to one-sided tests. In addition to H1 and H2 we will examine framing effects, 
i.e. whether choices and first- and second-order beliefs differ by treatment. Here we have no 
preconceived theory to guide us, and hence we perform two-sided tests. Of course, it would not 
be unreasonable to expect certain patterns of framing effects based on previous experimental 
work (recall the discussion in Section 3.B) and scholarly discussions. We will discuss how our 
results compare to these earlier findings, in Section 4.  
 
3.E Experimental design 
The standard linear public good game (Ledyard 1995) as introduced in Section 3.A is our 
workhorse. The subjects are randomly assigned to groups of three people and each subject is 
endowed with 20 ‘Taler’ (the experimental currency).     17 
We employ a 2×2 factorial design, which consists of two label and two valence frames. 
The label frame involves a minimal change in wording, naming the game in two different ways. 
In the NEUTRAL labeling, whenever the instructions or the decision screens refer to the 
experiment we speak of “the experiment”. In the COMMUNITY labeling, whenever we refer to the 
experiment we name it “the community experiment”.
16 
The valence frame entails describing the game as a “give-some” or a “take-some” game. 
The GIVE frame corresponds to the standard public good setting given in equation (3). The 
instructions explain carefully that (i) the Talers the subject keeps for herself generate an “income 
from Taler kept”; (ii) the Talers the subject contributes to a project of her group create an 
“income from the project”; (iii) the subject’s total income is the sum of both kinds of income. 
In the TAKE frame, subjects can take Talers from a “project”, the public good. The 
parameters were chosen to make the monetary payoff function in the TAKE frame equivalent to 
the GIVE situation. Therefore, the project consists of 60 Talers. Each subject i can take 
ti∈{0,1,...,20} Talers from the project and the payoff function under the TAKE frame is given by  
πi(t1, t2, t3)   = ti + ½⋅(60 – (t1 + t2 + t3))   (6) 
Note that (6) describes the same monetary payoff function as (3), since ti = 20 - ai. 





                                                 
16 The name of the game was changed at four place in the instructions, once on the decision screen for contributing to 
(taking from) the project, twice on each of the decision screens for first and second order belief elicitation.   18 









GIVE-NEUTRAL G IVE N EUTRAL 66 
GIVE-COMMUNITY G IVE C OMMUNITY 51 
TAKE-NEUTRAL T AKE N EUTRAL 72 
TAKE-COMMUNITY T AKE C OMMUNITY 66 
 
We ran the experiments in the Bonn Laboratory of Experimental Economics. All sessions 
were computerized, using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). In total, 255 people 
participated, almost all undergraduate students from Bonn University majoring in law, economics 
and other disciplines. We conducted 15 sessions (four in each of GIVE-NEUTRAL, TAKE-NEUTRAL 
and GIVE-COMMUNITY and three in TAKE-COMMUNITY) with 18 or 15 participants, respectively.  
The above public good problem was explained to the subjects in the instructions (see 
Appendix A). We took great care to ensure that subjects understood the game and the incentives. 
After subjects had read the instructions, for which they had plenty of time, they had to answer ten 
control questions that tested their understanding of the decision situation in the different 
treatment conditions. We did not proceed until all subjects had answered all questions correctly.  
After subjects had answered the control questions, they had to make their contribution or 
take decision. We then asked them to guess, on the one hand, the sum of their co-players’ 
contributions, and, on the other hand, the sum of their co-players’ guesses. For each of these 
guesses subjects were paid €20 each if their guesses were exactly correct, and nothing otherwise. 
These guesses form the basis of our measurement of (bij+ bik)/2 and (ciji+ ciki)/2.
17 When subjects 
                                                 
17 The incentives provided do not exactly provide incentives for means-revelation, as would seem relevant to the 
theory in section 3.C. A quadratic-scoring rule would theoretically provide such incentives but is also more difficult 
for subjects to comprehend. We chose our belief-elicitation protocol because it is simple and easy to explain. Our 
idea is to get a rough-but-meaningful estimate of the participants’ first- and second-order beliefs. We refer to   19 
made their contribution or take decisions they did not know about the subsequent estimation 
tasks. We decided on this timing of events because we did not want subjects’ choices of 
contributions to be influenced by what choice they thought might facilitate correct subsequent 
guesswork. Subjects played the game only once without being informed about their income 
before the end of the experiment. Thus, all decisions are strictly independent.  
We recruited subjects by campus advertisements that promised a monetary reward for 
participation in a decision-making task. In each session, subjects were randomly allocated to the 
cubicles, where they took their decisions in complete anonymity from the other participants. All 
participants were informed fully on all features of the design and the procedures. Sessions lasted 
about 1 hour. On average subjects earned €15.20 (roughly $15 at the time of the experiment).  
 
3.F Results 
Our analysis in this section will consist of two parts. First, we investigate how our frames 
affect beliefs and contributions. We then turn to our main focus: the test of guilt aversion and 
reciprocity (H1 and H2) as explanations for the observed contribution behavior. To make the data 
analysis between our TAKE and GIVE treatments comparable we express everything in the size of 
the public good (i.e., what people contribute to the public good in the GIVE treatments, or what 
subjects leave in the public good in the TAKE treatments).  
Result 1 concerns how our frames have affected beliefs.  
Result 1: The frames strongly affected first- and second-order beliefs. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Andersen, Fountain, Harrison & Rutström (2007) for a penetrating discussion about the pros and cons of various 
belief elicitation methods. 
   20 
Support: Figures 1 and 2 provide the main support for Result 1. Figure 1 shows the mean 
first-order beliefs (i.e., (bij+ bik)/2) and the confidence bounds.  
   21 



































We find that first-order beliefs vary between 8 tokens in GIVE-NEUTRAL and 4.2 tokens in 
TAKE-COMMUNITY.
18 A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test strongly rejects the null hypothesis 
that the first-order beliefs from our four treatments stem from the same distribution (χ
2(3) = 
18.28, p=0.0004). A parametric analysis of variance (ANOVA) comes to the same conclusion 
(F=6.63; p=0.0003). The analysis of variance with respect to the factors “valence” and “label” 
shows that the factor “valence” is highly significant (F=15.81; p=0.0001); “label” is marginally 
significant (F=3.26; p=0.0722). The interaction variable “label×valence” is insignificant (F=0.00, 
p=0.9783). We conclude that both the context and in particular the valence framing affect the 
first-order beliefs. Most importantly, subjects in the TAKE treatments hold lower beliefs that 
others contribute than subjects in the GIVE treatments.  
                                                 
18  The medians (standard deviations) of first-order beliefs are as follows. GIVE-NEUTRAL: 7.5 (5.8); GIVE-
COMMUNITY: 6.0 (6.8); TAKE-NEUTRAL: 5.0 (4.1); TAKE-COMMUNITY: 3.0 (4.1). See Appendix B for a histogram of 
first-order beliefs.     22 
Figure 2 depicts the means and confidence bounds of the second-order beliefs (i.e., (ciji+ 
ciki)/2).
19 We find that the distributions of second-order beliefs are as well strongly and highly 
significantly affected by the frames (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ
2(3) = 21.97, p = 0.0001). Again, an 
ANOVA supports this finding (F=8.11; p=0.0000): the factor “valence” is highly significant 
(F=16.00; p=0.0001); “label” is significant at the five-percent level (F=4.75; p=0.0303); and the 
interaction variable “label×valence” is insignificant (F=2.08; p=0.1506). In other words, subjects 
in the TAKE treatments believe that the other group members expect them to contribute less than 
subjects in the GIVE treatments. Similarly, subjects believe that others expect them to contribute 
less in the COMMUNITY treatments than in the NEUTRAL treatments.  
 




































                                                 
19  The medians (standard deviations) of second-order beliefs are as follows. GIVE-NEUTRAL: 9.5 (5.5); GIVE-
COMMUNITY: 6.25 (5.5); TAKE-NEUTRAL: 5.0 (5.5); TAKE-COMMUNITY: 5.0 (4.4). See Appendix B for a histogram 
of second-order beliefs.  
   23 
We now turn to contributions. Before we investigate how beliefs have affected choices, 
we look at contributions under the different frames. Result 2 records our findings.  
Result 2: The frames affected contributions but less strongly than beliefs.  
Support: Figure 3 provides the support for Result 2. Mean contributions are highest under 
GIVE-NEUTRAL and lowest under TAKE-COMMUNITY.
20 A Kruskal-Wallis test suggests weakly 
significant differences between treatments (χ
2(3)=6.66, p=0.0837). An ANOVA shows weakly 
significant treatment differences (F=2.63; p=0.0508) as well: the factor “label” is significant 
(F=4.23; p=0.0408); “valence” is marginally significant (F=2.99; p=0.0850); and the interaction 
variable “label×valence” is insignificant (F=0.26; p=0.6119).
21  
 





























                                                 
20 The median contributions (standard deviations) are as follows. GIVE-NEUTRAL: 4.5 (6.6); GIVE-COMMUNITY: 0.0 
(6.4); TAKE-NEUTRAL: 0.0 (.69); TAKE-COMMUNITY: 0.0 (4.5). See Appendix B for a histogram of contributions.  
21 If we drop this insignificant interaction variable, the model becomes significant (F=3.83; p=0.0231).    24 
It is potentially surprising that the COMMUNITY frame has lowered beliefs and 
contributions relative to the NEUTRAL frame. We will comment on this finding in Section 4. 
We will now turn our attention to the behavioral link between beliefs – which we have 
shown to be strongly affected by the frames – and behavior. Specifically, we will test our two 
main hypotheses H1 and H2, on guilt aversion and reciprocity, respectively.  
Result 3 records the result concerning guilt aversion. 
Result 3: The data support the guilt aversion hypothesis H1.  
Support: Figure 4 and Table 2 contain the evidence in favor of Result 3. Figure 4 provides 
a graphical illustration of the guilt aversion hypothesis. In this figure we depict contributions as a 
function of the second-order beliefs (i.e., (ciji+ ciki)/2). The symbols represent combinations of 
contributions and second-order beliefs per treatment. The size of symbols is proportional to the 
underlying number of observations. Our hypothesis is that for subjects who contribute non-zero 
amounts contributions and second-order beliefs are positively correlated. We therefore 
distinguish in Figure 4 between zero contributions for positive second-order beliefs (indicated as 
filled circles on the x-axes) and the other contributions (indicated as triangles). The bold line is 
the trend line of the relationship between contributions and second-order beliefs (excluding the 
observations ai=0&(ciji+ ciki)/2>0).  
   25 











































































































Figure 4 shows, first, that many subjects chose zero contributions even if they reported 
positive second-order beliefs: The fraction of subjects with positive second-order beliefs and zero 
contributions is very similar across all treatments (χ
2(3)=0.29, p=0.96) and ranges from 27.8 
percent in TAKE-NEUTRAL to 31.8 percent in TAKE-COMMUNITY. Second, contributions and 
second-order beliefs of subjects other than those who have a zero contribution despite a positive 
second-order belief are positively correlated in all four treatments.
22 Table 3 corroborates this 
finding econometrically. Contributions and second-order beliefs are highly significantly 
                                                 
22 This result can be compared to findings in Dufwenberg & Gneezy (2000), Bhatt & Camerer (2005), Charness & 
Dufwenberg (2006), and Bacharach, Guerra & Zizzo (2007), concerning similar choice – second-order belief 
correlation in other games.   26 
positively correlated (t-values > 4.5).
23 Yet, the explained variance differs between treatments as 
the figure shows and as the regressions show formally. In GIVE-COMMUNITY, for instance, R
2 = 
0.66, whereas in TAKE-COMMUNITY R
2 = 0.31. 
 
Table 2: Testing the guilt aversion hypothesis 
 Dependent  variable:  Contributions   
 G IVE-NEUTRAL G IVE-COMMUNITY TAKE-NEUTRAL TAKE-COMMUNITY
Second-order beliefs  0.669  0.922  0.959  0.544 
 (0.130)***  (0.105)***  (0.118)***  (0.119)*** 
Constant 1.957  0.644  2.035  1.527 
 (1.069)*  (0.404)  (0.896)**  (0.876)* 
Observations 47  36  52  45 
R-squared 0.38  0.66  0.45  0.31 
Notes: 1. OLS-regression; Robust standard errors in parentheses.     
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
3. Zero contributions for positive second-order beliefs are excluded.    
 
When we test whether the regression coefficients are significantly different across 
treatments, we find that the constants are the same across treatments (F(3,172) = 1.08; p = 0.359). 
The slopes, however, differ significantly across treatments (F(3,172) = 2.94, p = 0.0349), which 
implies that the frame affects the relationship between second-order beliefs and contributions.  
We turn now to reciprocity and H2, which concerns the relation between a subject’s 
contribution and his or her first-order beliefs. Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration. We 
distinguish between subjects who contribute nothing despite a first-order belief (bij+ bik)/2 = 20; 
(indicated by filled circles on the x-axes), and the others (indicated by triangles). The size of 
symbols is proportional to the number of observations. The bold line is again the trend line 
(excluding observations ai=0&(bij+ bik)/2 = 20).  
                                                 
23 This is actually true whether or not we include those subjects i for which ai = 0 & (ciji+ciki)/2 > 0.    27 
Result 4: The data support the reciprocity hypothesis H2.   
Support: Figure 5 and Table 3 provide the support for Result 4.  
 











































































































First, across all treatments, four participants contributed nothing despite holding an 
average first-order belief = 20. Second, contributions and first-order beliefs of the remaining 
subjects are on average positively correlated. The trend line follows the diagonal quite closely in 
all treatments (except TAKE-COMMUNITY), which means that subjects matched their first-order 
belief on average, as predicted by our reciprocity hypothesis.    28 
Table 3 corroborates these findings econometrically. We again confine our attention to 
subjects other than those who have a zero contribution despite an average first-order belief = 20. 
We find that all first-order belief coefficients are significantly positive (t-values vary between 
14.4 in GIVE-COMMUNITY  and 2.49 in TAKE-COMMUNITY).
24 Again, the explained variance 
differs between treatments. The R
2 is highest in GIVE-COMMUNITY (0.66) and lowest in TAKE-
COMMUNITY (R
2 = 0.12). In other words, the link between first-order beliefs and contributions is 
tightest in GIVE-COMMUNITY and loosest in TAKE-COMMUNITY.  
 
Table 3: Testing the reciprocity hypothesis 
 Dependent  variable:  Contributions 
 G IVE-NEUTRAL G IVE-COMMUNITY TAKE-NEUTRAL TAKE-COMMUNITY
First-order beliefs  0.735  0.973  0.752  0.371 
 (0.115)***  (0.067)***  (0.128)***  (0.149)** 
Constant 0.022  -1.771  1.187  1.23 
 (0.895)  (0.503)***  (0.723)  (0.705)* 
Observations 65  50  70  66 
R-squared 0.40  0.66  0.31  0.12 
Notes: 1. OLS-regression; Robust standard errors in parentheses.     
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
3. Zero contributions for average first-order beliefs = 20 are excluded.   
 
When testing for the regression coefficients in Table 3 to be different from one another, 
we find the slopes to differ significantly between treatments (F(3,243) = 5.02; p = 0.0022). The 
constants are highly significantly different from one another (F(3,243) = 5.88; p = 0.0007) as 
well. Thus, frames shift both the level and the slope of the relationship of first-order beliefs and 
contributions.  
                                                 
24 This is actually true whether or not we include those subjects i for which ai = 0 & (bij+bik)/2 = 20.  
   29 
In summary, our results show that frames affect beliefs and beliefs affect contribution 
behavior. This finding can be embraced by psychological game theory, and indeed individual 
subject data on choices and beliefs exhibit support for psychological-game based theories of guilt 
aversion and reciprocity. This is the main finding of Section 3.F. 
 
4. THE IMPACT OF OUR FRAMES – SOME DISCUSSION 
We have documented systematic evidence regarding how frames move beliefs and 
behavior. First- and second-order beliefs (and contributions) are higher with a GIVE frame than 
with a TAKE frame, in line with previous findings quoted in Section 3.B. These and our own 
findings are consistent with ideas based on the concept of decision-induced focusing (van Dijk & 
Wilke 2000). This concept rests on the idea that subjects are focused on the decision they are 
explicitly asked to make (contribute under the GIVE frame and take under the TAKE frame). A 
decision induces an initial focus in the sense that participants having to decide on how much to 
give are more focused on the part of their endowment they contribute than on the part of their 
endowment they keep for themselves. The reverse holds for the take decision.  
As to the label frame, first- and second-order beliefs (and contributions) are higher with a 
NEUTRAL than with a COMMUNITY frame, seemingly at odds with some previous findings (Ross 
& Ward; Liberman, Samuels & Ross and Rege & Telle who are closest to our design). At first 
sight, our result may seem implausible as the COMMUNITY frame is generally associated with 
positive connotation. Imagine, however, a student in a dorm (his "community") where others 
never voluntarily clean the common rooms like bathroom and kitchen and free ride at parties by 
hardly ever contributing drinks and snacks. This student may believe that others contribute 
nothing or only peanuts in an experiment presented under a COMMUNITY frame!    30 
The general point is as follows. Since our experiments were one-shot games, subjects had 
no other possibility than to infer others’ behavior and expectations from their life experiences. A 
frame may serve as a cue on comparable social situations and these cues may be subject-pool 
dependent. Thus, a community-frame may induce some subject pools to contribute less than 
under a neutral frame (and to hold respective first- and second-order beliefs) if for most subjects 
the community cue is associated with low cooperation; for others the opposite may hold.  
We tested this idea by replicating our experiment in the GIVE-treatments with 48 subjects 
from the University of St. Gallen. St. Gallen is a small Swiss university with a strong corporate 
identity, where students from the very beginning are socialized into the “University of St. Gallen 
community”. By contrast, the University of Bonn is a huge and much more anonymous university 
with no strong community-spirited corporate identity.
25 As hypothesized, we found no subject 
pool differences in the NEUTRAL frame. The COMMUNITY frame, however, induced significantly 




5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Framing effects are a challenge to traditional rational choice models, which assume 
description invariance. In this paper we first argued that psychological-game theoretic models can 
accommodate framing effects without reference to bounded rationality or cognitive biases. We 
                                                 
25 We used exactly the same protocol, instructions, software and incentives in both subject pools similarly composed 
as to students’ majors. 
26 The detailed results in St. Gallen (Bonn) are as follows: (GIVE-)NEUTRAL – mean first-order beliefs: 8.9 (8.1); 
mean second-order beliefs: 8.1 (9.2); mean contributions: 6.8 (5.7); (GIVE-)COMMUNITY – mean first-order beliefs: 
10.6 (6.8); mean second-order beliefs: 9.7 (6.8); mean contributions: 10.4 (4.5). Second-order beliefs are 
insignificantly higher under the COMMUNITY frame than under the NEUTRAL frame in St. Gallen. First- and second-
order beliefs are marginally insignificantly higher in COMMUNITY t h a n  i n  N EUTRAL (Mann-Whitney tests, 
p<0.1185). In NEUTRAL, we find only marginally insignificant support for guilt aversion in St. Gallen. In 
COMMUNITY, the support for the guilt aversion and the reciprocity hypotheses is very similar in both subject pools.     31 
then used public good experiments to examine the empirical relevance of this claim. We find 
support for two psychological-game based theories which can accommodate framing effects, 
namely guilt aversion and reciprocity. 
All in all, we have proposed to understand framing as a two-part process where (i) frames 
move beliefs, and (ii) beliefs shape motivation and choice. Guilt aversion and reciprocity theory 
furnish specific statements about (ii), for which we have found empirical support. We have not 
proposed and tested any theory as regards (i), but our results contribute to understanding the 
subtle interplay between framing, beliefs and choices. A challenge for future work is to develop a 
theory of framing that can explain also (i).  
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Appendix A 
Note: Text in brackets denotes the [GIVE treatments]. 
 
Instructions to the (community) experiment  
 
Welcome to the (community) experiment 
General information on the (community) experiment 
 
You are now participating in an economic experiment which is financed by the European Union. If you read the 
following explanations carefully, you’ll be able to earn a considerable amount of money – depending on your 
decisions. Therefore it is important to actually read the instructions very carefully. 
The instructions are for your private information only. During the experiment it is not allowed to communicate 
with other participants in any way. If you have questions, please consult us.  
During the experiment, we will not talk about Euro, but about Taler. Your total income will first be calculated in 
Taler. The total amount of Taler that you have accumulated during the experiment will be converted into Euro at the 
end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 
1 Taler = 0.50 Euros 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid the total amount of Taler earned during the experiment and 
converted into Euro in cash. 
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants will be randomly divided into groups of three. Besides you, 
there will be two more members in your group. You will neither learn before nor after the experiment, who the 
other persons in your group are. 
The experiment consists of only one task. You have to decide how many Taler you take from [contribute to] a 
project of your group and how many Taler you leave in the project [keep for yourself]. On the following pages 
we will describe the exact course of the experiment. At the end of this introductory information we ask you to do 
several control exercises which are designed to familiarize you with the decision situation. 
 
The decision in the (community) experiment 
 
At the beginning of the first stage, there are 60 Taler in a project of your group [every participant receives an 
“endowment” of 20 Taler]. You then have to decide how many of these 60 Taler you take from the project for 
yourself or how many you leave in the project. [You then have to decide how many of these 20 Taler you contribute 
to the project or how many you keep for yourself.] Each participant can take up to 20 Taler from the project [can 
contribute up to 20 Taler]. The two other members of your group have to make the same decision. They can also 
either take Taler from the project for themselves or leave Taler in the project. [They can also either contribute Taler 
to the project or keep Taler for themselves.] You and the other members of the group can choose any amount to be 
taken [contribution] between 0 and 20 Taler. 
Every Taler that you take from the project for yourself [do not contribute to the project] automatically belongs to 
you and will be paid to you, converted by the exchange rate given above, at the end of the experiment. 
The following happens to the Taler that are not taken from [that are contributed to] the project: The project’s value 
will be multiplied by 1.5 and this amount will be divided equally among all three members of the group. If for 
instance 1 Taler is not taken from [is contributed to] the project, the Taler’s value increases to 1.5 Taler. This amount 
is divided equally among all three members of the group. Thus every group member receives 0.5 Taler.  
Your income from the project rises by 0.5 Taler if you take one Taler less from [contribute one Taler more to] the 
project. At the same time, the income of the other two members of the group also rises by 0.5 Taler, because they 
receive the same income from the project as you do. Therefore, if you take one Taler less from [contribute one Taler 
more to] the project the income from the project with regard to the whole group increases by 1.5 Taler. It also holds 
that your income rises by 0.5 Taler if another group member takes one Taler less from [contributes one Taler more 
to] the project.  
After all three members of the group have made their decisions about the amounts they take from [their 
contributions to] the project the total income achieved by each participant is determined. 
 
How is your income calculated from your decision?   36 
 
The income of every member of the group is calculated in the same way. The income consists of two parts: 
(1)  the Taler that somebody takes [keeps] for himself/herself (“income from Taler taken [kept]”) 
(2)  the “income from the project”. The income from the project is 
1.5 × (60 - sum of all Taler taken from the project)/3 = 
0.5 × (60 - sum of all Taler taken from the project)  
[1.5 × (sum of all Taler contributed to the project)/3 = 
 0.5 × (sum of all Taler contributed to the project)]. 
 
Therefore your total income will be calculated by the following formula: 
Your total income = 
                  Income from Taler taken [kept] + Income from project = 
                                     (Taler taken by you) + 0.5 × (60 - sum of all Taler taken from project) 
     [(20 – Taler you contributed to project) + 0.5 × (sum of all Taler contributed to project)] 
 
If you take all 20 Taler from [do not contribute anything to] the project, your “income from Taler taken [kept]” is 
20. If you take [contribute] for instance 10 Taler from [to] the project, your “income from Taler taken [kept]” is 10. 
At the same time, the total sum of Taler left in [contributed to] the project decreases [increases] and so does your 
“income from the project”. 
 
In order to explain the income calculation we give some examples: 
•  If each of the three members of the group takes 20 Taler from [contributes 0 Taler to] the project, all three 
will receive an “income from Taler taken [kept]” of 20. Nobody receives anything from the project, because 
no one left [contributed] anything. Therefore, the total income of every member of the group is 20 Taler. 
Calculation of the total income of every participant:(20) + 0.5 * (60-60) = 20 
[Calculation of the total income of every participant:(20 – 0) + 0.5 * (0) = 20] 
•  If each of the three members of the group takes 0 [contributes 20] Taler there will a total of 60 Taler left in 
[contributed to] the project. The “income from Taler taken [kept]” is zero for everyone, but each member 
receives an income from the project of 0.5 * 60 = 30 Taler. 
Calculation of the total income of every participant:(0) + 0.5 * (60-0) = 30 
[Calculation of the total income of every participant:(20 – 20) + 0.5 * (60) = 30] 
•  If you take 0 [contribute 20] Taler, the second member 10 and the third member 20 [0] Taler, the following 
incomes are calculated. 
–  Because the second and third member have together taken 30 Taler [you and the second member have 
together contributed 30 Taler], everyone will receive 0.5 * 30 = 15 Taler from the project.  
–  You took 0 [contributed all your 20] Taler from [to] the project. You will therefore receive 15 Taler in 
total at the end of the experiment.  
–  The second member of the group also receives 15 Taler from the project. In addition, he receives 10 
Taler “income from Taler taken [kept]” because he took [contributed only] 10 Taler from [to] the 
project [Thus, 10 Taler remain for himself], and he receives 15 + 10 = 25 Taler altogether. 
–  The third member of the group, who took all Taler [did not contribute anything], also receives the 15 
Taler from the project and additionally the 20 Taler “income from Taler taken [kept]”, which means 20 
+ 15 = 35 Taler altogether. 
Calculation of your total income: (0) + 0.5 * (60-30) = 15 
Calculation of the total income of the 2
nd group
 member: (10) + 0.5 *  (60-30) = 25 
Calculation of the total income of the 3
rd group
 member: (20) + 0.5 * (60-30) = 35 
[Calculation of your total income: (20 – 20) + 0.5 * (30) = 15 
Calculation of the total income of the 2
nd group
 member: (20 – 10) + 0.5 * (30) = 25 
Calculation of the total income of the 3
rd group
 member: (20 – 0) + 0.5 * (30) = 35] 
•  The two other members of your group take 0 [contribute 20] Taler each from [to] the project. You take all 
Taler [do not contribute anything]. In this case the income will be calculated as follows: 
Calculation of your total income (amount taken 20): (20) + 0.5 * (60-20) = 40   37 
Calculation of the total income of the 2
nd and 3
rd group member (amount taken 0): 
(0) + 0.5 * (60-20) = 20 
[Calculation of your total income (contribution 0): (20 – 0) + 0.5 * (40) = 40 
Calculation of the total income of the 2
nd and 3
rd group member (contribution 20): 
(20 – 20) + 0.5 * (40) = 20] 
 
When making your decision you will see the following screen:  
 
 
Please make the decision on the amount to be taken by you [your contribution] in the (community) experiment 
now. 
 
In the project, there are [Your endowment]             60 [20] 
The amount to be taken by you from [Your contribution to] the project….. 
 
You will make your decision on a screen like the one above and enter into the blank space how many Taler you 
take from [contribute to] the project. 
After you have made your decision please press the OK-button. As long as you did not press the button you can 
change your decision anytime. 




First order belief statement (text of questions) 
After you have taken your decision in the (community) experiment we would like to ask you for the following 
statement: 
Please estimate how many Taler the other two members of the group have taken from [contributed to] the 
project in total.  
If you estimated the correct amount you will be paid 20 EURO.  
Example 1:  
You estimate that the other two members of the group took [contributed] 31 Taler from [to] the project. In fact, 
both members took [contributed] 19 and 12 Taler. Your estimation was correct and you will be paid 20 EURO  
Example 2:    38 
You estimate that the other two members of the group took [contributed] 17 Taler from [to] the project. In fact, 
both members took [contributed] 12 and 6 Taler. Your estimation was wrong and you will be paid 0 EURO  
(Note that your estimation must be a number between 0 and 40 including these numbers.)  





Second order belief statement (text of questions) 
Each member in your group has estimated in the same way as you did how many Taler in total the other two 
members of the group took from [contributed to] the project.  
Please estimate now the sum of amounts the other two group members stated as estimation in the (community) 
experiment. 
If you estimated the correct amount you will be paid 20 EURO.  
Example 1:  
You estimate that the other two members of the group stated an estimation of 57 Taler. In fact, the second member 
stated 31 and the third member stated 26 Taler as estimation.  
Your estimation was correct and you will be paid 20 EURO  
Example 2:  
You estimate that the other two members of the group stated an estimation of 42 Taler. In fact, the second member 
stated 17 and the third member stated 21 Taler as estimation.  
Your estimation was wrong and you will be paid 0 EURO  
(Note that your estimation must be a number between 0 and 80 including these numbers.)  
Estimated sum of amounts the other two group members stated as estimation in the (community) experiment:    39 
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